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PROMINENT ALUMNUS PASSES
AWAY.
Martin Wolfe, a member of the class of
'99, died at his home in Shamokin, the
latter part of April, from kidney trouble,
after an illness of several months. Several
weeks prior to his death he went to a
health resort in South Carolina, thinking
that the change would prolong his life. A
short residence there convinced him and
his attending physician that no substantial benefit could be derived from his remaining there, so he returned home and
prepared to meet the summons to take the
last long journey. When It came, he met
it bravely and calmly, breathing his last
in the presence of the members of his
family and immediate friends.
Martin Wolfe was beloved by those who
knew him intimately. He possessed the
characteristics that endeared him to those
with whom he associated. His death removed from the legal ranks of Shamokin
one of the brightest of its youngest members. By his perseverance and his ability
to grasp legal propositions he had established a lucrative practice.

SENIOR CLASS RECEPTION.
On Tuesday evening, May 5th, Dr. and
Mrs. George E. Reed entertained the
members of the Senior class of the Law
School and the members of the Middle
class who expect to graduate this year.
During the evening the following programme was rendered:
Recitation-Miss Eva Fisher.
Violin Selection-Claude M. Stouffer.
Solos-Walter Bishop.
Solos-Miss Edith Prince.
Reading-Mirs. Dr. Reed.
Solo-Dr. Reed.
SCHOOL NOTES.
Frederick W. Fleitz, Deputy Attorney
General of this State, was a guest of honor
at a social session of the Dickinson Chapter
of the Delta Chi fraternity on the evening
of May 6th. He is an honorary member
of the local chapter of that fraternity and
takes great interest in its welfare.
Dively, of the Middle class, was recently
elected captain of the base ball team, vice
Carlin, of the same class, who resigned.
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Spencer, Prickett, and Hillyer, of the
Middle class, were in Chambersburg on
the 5th inst., attending a dance conducted
by the Cotillion Club of that town.
Schwartzkopf, of the Junior class, was
initiated into the Delta Chi fraternity
during the present month.
Two members of the Senior class, Hickernell and Yeagley, have announced their
intention of taking the examination to be
conducted by the Supreme Court board of
examiners in June.
They will present
themselves for examination in Harrisburg,
and if they succeed in passing, will practice
in Lebanon county, where they reside.
The bar of that county has abandoned its
local board and has adopted a rule to admit to practice there only those who comply with the requirements necessary for
admission to the Supreme Court.
The members of the Senior class and the
members of the Middle class who expect
to graduate, have begun toissueinvitations
to the Commencement Exercises of the
Law Sohool. The exercises will be conducted in Bosler Hall, on Tuesday evening, June 9th.
Heller and Morgan, of the Junior class,
and Hubler, of the Middle class, who
are registered in Luzerne county, will
take the first year's examination for admission to the bar of that county, next
month. The rules of that county permit
students who are registered in the county
to take a prescribed number of subjects
each year, for three years.
The Junior class held its banquet in
Assembly Hall, on the evening of April
30th, or rather on the morning of May 1st.
Fearing molestation from the Middle class,
the banquet was not begun until 12.30 n.
in., and the fact that such an event was to
be held was successfully concealed from
the members of that class until the morning afterward.
Albertson, '03, recently took the preliminary examination for admission to the
Atlantic City Bar, and having passed, will
be eligible for his final examinations in
a few months. He is a resident of that
city.

At the Inter-Scholastic meet at the athletic field, May 2nd, the following Law
men acted as officials: Fleitz, Core, Benjamin, Phillips, Longbottom, Fox, and
Gerber.
Professor Sadler's book, on Crimes and
Criminal Procedure, met with an unprecedented advance sale. Although the book
is not yet printed the advance sale has almost exhausted the first edition. Every
lawyer who has seen the prospectus of the
work has pronounced it the most comprehensive Pennsylvania work of its character extant. The criminal lawyers of this
state have long desired a work of this kind.
The parents of Reeser, '05, have taken
up their residence in Carlisle. His father
was recently appointed presiding elder of
this conference of the Evangelical church.
The Seniors' outing, this year, will be
held June 1st, at Mt. Alto, a delightful resort on the Cumberland Valley Railroad.

ALUMNI NEWS.
Hon. L. P. Holcomb, '01, Wilkesbarre,
Pa., was in town the early part of this
month.
Hugus, a member of the Junior class last
year, was in town for several days this
month. He was recently admitted to the
Westmoreland County Bar, having passed
the examination prescribed by the board
of examiners of that county.
McConnell, '02. has been admitted to
the Allegheny County Bar. He has located
in Pittsburg, and has opened a suite of
offices in the Frick Building in that city.
Johns, '98, w.as elected national president of the Delta Chi fraternity at the
convention held in New York last month.
For several years he has been a member of
the national board of that organization,
and during that time participated actively
in its affairs. His election to the presidency is a recognition of the substantial
work he performed while a member of that
board.
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BOOK REVIEWS.
CASES ON EQUITY PLEADING AND PRAC'ICE-By Bradley M. Thompson, M1.S.
LL. B., Jury Professor of Law in University of Michigan. Publishedby Callaghan & Co., Chicago, Ill. One volume,
buckram, 3.00 net.
In this work the author has compiled
numerous leading cases illustrating the
principles of equity pleading and practice.
Each case is reported in such a manner
that the principle involved stands out
prominently, and can be obtained therefrom by a casual reading. The facts of
each case are concisely stated, and only so
much of the opinion is reported as to bring
out the principle in pleading for which
the ease is an authority. It is a valuable
work for students and should be of some
assistance to the practitioner.
CASES ON CRIMINAL LAw-By Jerome
C. Knowlton, A. B. LL. B., Marshall
Professor of Law in University of Michigan, assisted by W. Dwyer, LL. B., Instructor in the Law Department of the
University of M1ichigan. Published by
Callaghan & Co., Chicago, Ill. One
volume, buckram, 3.00 net.
In the collection of cases compiled in
this work the more important principles of criminal law are elucidated. Each
case stands for one principle and it is
so reported that no difficulty is experienced in grasping and retaining that
principle. The cases cover a wide field
of criminal law, and to the student
and the criminal lawyer should be of
some assistance. Primarily, the work
was intended for the former, but it can be
used with advantage by the latter. The
cases are taken from nearly every state in
the Union, and are recognized as the leading cases for the principle which they support.
THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY
UNDER NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
OF 1898 AS AMENDED BY ACT OF FEB-

RUARY 5, 1903.-By William I. H~otchhins, referee in bankruptcy, at Buffalo,
.N. Y., and lecturer on the Law of Bankruptcyinthe Buffalo Law School. Published by Mathew Bender,Albany, N. Y.
Price, law sheep, P6, or $6.80 delivered.
This is a new edition of "Collier on
Bankruptcy." It is a comprehensive and
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valuable work. It contains the history
of bankruptcy in this country and England
together with the various acts adopted on
that subject in the U. S. since 1800. The
present act of bankruptcy is discussed
from every conceivable standpoint and
the interpretation of its provisions are supported by a large number of cases. The
whole work is cross referenced to bring together the analogous provisions not only
of the four American statutes but of the
English law as well. Another valuable
feature of the edition is the forms necessary to proceed in bankruptcy. There are
about 60 of these forms, based upon the
author's experience. Their arrangement
is of such a character that it would be almost impossible to err if the petition or
form were taken from this book.
The author of this work is a referee in
bankruptcy in Buffalo, N. Y., and is also
the author of the Ray Amendatory Bill
(which is now thelaw). Heis recognized
the country over as an authority on the
Law and Practice in Bankruptcy. His
treatment of the law is viewed not only
from the standpoint of the referee but also
from the standpoint of the practitioner.
In the arrangement of cases, the thoroughness of discussion and the classification of the law the book excels the previous editions.

MOOT COURT.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHN WOODS.
Ante-nuptial contract-Marriagebetween
cousinsnot voidable after death of either
party-Act of 1901 construed-But criminal marriage an illegal consideration
for the ante-nuptial contract-No recovery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On April 1, 1902, John Wood and Sarah
Hughes, at Carlisle, Pa., entered into an
ante-nuptial contract by the terms of
which, in consideration of marriage and
of relinquishment by her of all claims on
his property, said Wood promised to pay
the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.
The following day the above parties were
married at Hagerstown, Maryland. The
couple resided in Carlisle until the death
of Wood, October 11, 1902. The aboAa
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sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars was

limit ourselves to the aets of the Penn-

never paid, and the widow now demands
it before the auditor, who is making distribution of the personal fund. It was
shown that the parties to the contract
were first cousins, and that there is a
statute in Pennsylvania forbidding first
cousins to marry. The marriage was valid
by the laws of Maryland.
Previous to, as well as after, the marriage,
both parties were residents of Pennsylvania.
Hir,LYEtt and MORGAN for the plaintiflf.
Where a marriage is shown, its validity
is presumed. Commonwealth v. Stump,
53 Pa. 132. The unlawfulness of an iicestuous marriage cannot be inquired into
after the death of eit her husband or wife.
.- arker's Appeal, 44 Pa. 309; Griffith v.
Smith, 1 Clark 479; Walter's Appeal, 70
Pa. 392. The act of June 24, 1901, comes
within the rule of Walter's Appeal, supra.
DIvELY and PATTERSON for the defendant.
A marriage void by law of Petinsylvyania is not validated by the parties contracting in another state to avoid the
statute. Estate of Stull, 183 Pa. 625. Pennsylvania does not recognize the laws of
another state in regard to marriage and
divorce. Calvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 Reel
y. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Van Storch v. Griffin,
71 Pa. 240; Estate of Stull, 183 Pa. 625:
Squires v. Squires, 25 C. 0. R. 463.
The ante-nuptial agreement was an illegal contract, being to avoid the act of
assembly. Conlow v. Morton, 4 Yeates
24; Maybin v. Gonlon, 4 Dall. 298. The
contract was made in this state, to be performed in this state, and is governed by
the law of Pennsylvania. Healy v. B. &
S. Assoc., 17 Sup. 385; McKean v. B. &.
S. Assoc., 24 C. C. R. 458.
0 'INION OF THE COURT.

This-action grew out of an ante-nuptial
contract, but its enforcement has been attacked upon the grounds of the consanguinity of the parties alone, hence, it is
unnecessary to discuss the general character and enforceability of ante-nuptial contracts. It is sufficient to say that these
contracts are recognized as binding in
Pennsylvania. Frank's Appeal, 55 Pa.
190; Jones' Appeal, 62 Pa. 324; Neely's
Appeal, 9 Crum. 424. As to the real point
at issue, it is not our purpose to discuss
martial consanguinity in England and in
the earlier history of our country. Those
desiring an able discussion on the same,
we refer to the opinion of J. Sharswood,
in Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. 393; but to

sylvauia Legislature of 1815, 1860, and
1901, as our law is governed by these three
acts. The first of these actp, March 13,
1815, section 4, Pamph. Law 150, provided
"that all marriages within th: degrees of
consanguinity or affinity, according to
the table established by law are hereby
void to all intents and purposes," and
after investing the courts ofcommon pleas
with jurisdiction to decree divorces in such
cases, it declares: "but when any of the
said marriages shall not have been dissolved during the lifetime of the parties,
the lawfulness of the same shall not be
inquired into after the death of either
husband or wife." It is clear, from the
provisions of this act, that marriages with.
in the degrees of consanguinity and affinity are void and can be inquired into anywhere and in any proceeding, but they
are voidable in. that, if not dissolved in.
the lifetime of the parties, their viklidity
cannot be questioned after the death of
either. Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. 309. The
facts of that case were as follows - Jolan
J. Parker and Frances J. Noblit. were
married, but the rmarriage was, not made
public. The degree Qf consauguiaity in
which they stood to each otli.er
was uQcle
and niece. On the 4th of Sept., 1861, Mr.
Parker died, X. Read decided, thai the.
voidableq marriage never having been disolved,, all inquiry into its unilawfnlne
was closed, andMrs, Parkex,as his wido.w,
became qntitled tQ adiniuster upQn th
estate.
Ho.wever, itmust be con cdedthat stweb
marriages are destru.ctive to good moral;4
and should be. severely punished.. TbjA
unquestionably was the purpose, of tb.
next act, 31st of March,. 18.60, the 39,tb,
sectiou of wbicb states that. "if any- pe .
son shall inter-marry wilhin the degrees
of consanguinity or affinity, he or sbh
shall on conviction, be sentenced to pay a
fine of $50, and to uindergo an imprisonment, by separate or solitary confinement
at labor not exceeding three years," and
adds, "that all such marriages-are hereby
declared void." It waa contended that
the act of 1815 was repealed by this section
of act of 1860; but the Supreme Court in
Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392, S'harswood,
J., decided that "ibis simply a declaration
of-the same law,"
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In June, 1901, another act on question
of marriage within the degrees of consanguinity and affinity, was passed by the
Pennsylvania Legislature, prohibiting the
marriage of first cousins.
The act of 1901, P. L. page 597, provides
as follows: "Sec. 1. Be it enacted, etc.,
that from and after the first day of Jan.
A. D. 1902, it shall be unlawful for any
male person and female person, who are
kin of the degree of first cousins, to be
joined in marriage."
"Sec. 2. All marriages contracted in violation of the provisions of the first section
of this act are hereby declared void."
"Sec. 3. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby declared repealed."
No case having arisen since the passage
of this act, it iaimpossible for any man to
tell how the Supreme Court will construe
it, consequently the effect of the same
must be argued out on the acts of 1815 and
1860, and upon which the courts have
passed.
To our mind, the act of 1901 is simply
supplementary to the previous acts designating the degrees, and prohibiting first
cousins from marrying. In all other respects it seems natural to think the legislature expected this act to be construed, as
the former acts have been construed.
Therefore, it seems but a reasonable conclusion, that the unlawfulness of marriage
of first cousins cannot be inquired into
after the death of either party. Theother
view of the legislative act would involve
the absurdity ofdeclaring absolutely void
the marriage of first cousins, while the
marriage by brother and sister would be
only voidable and could not be attacked
after the death of either.
From the above, we must come to the
conclusion that if plaintiff and deceased
had been married in this state, and the
validity of the marriage had not been
questioned until after the death of the deceased, the plaintiff can recover.
Will the fact that the cousins went to
Maryland to be married, prevent a recovery? We think not. The parties
knowing that their marriage could be annulled during their lifetime, in their own
state, and knowing also that by the laws
of Maryland the marriage of first cousins
was valid, went to that state to be married,
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believing that by so doing they could pre.
vent this annulment in their own state,
but it is held by a long line of decisions,
both in England and this country, that
persons domiciled in a state cannot evade
its laws by going to another state and then
returning to live in the home state in a
union that state prohibits.
Sussex v.
Beerage Case, 11 Clark & Fin. 85; Brooks
v. Brook, 9 H. L Cases 212; Williams v.
Oates, 5 fred. Law Repts. N. 0. 535; Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun. 238; Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625. And the parties are no
better off than as if they were married iu
Pennsylvania, and are to be treated, in
this instance, as though married in Pennsylvania.
The counsel for the defendant contend
that the case at bar is similar to the case
cited in their briefs.
Stull's Estate, 183
Pa. 625. Without giving the facts in the
case, we will attempt to show the difference in the way they have been construed.
In the one case the statute (1815) says,
"the husband or wife who have been guilty
of the crime of adultery shall not marry
the person with whom the said crime was
committed during the lifetime of the
former wife or husband," and the Supreme
Court has construed the same to make the
marriage void without limiting the time.
Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625. While in the
other (statute 1815), the marriage is void,
and the validity of the marriage cannot
be attacked after the death of either of
the parties. Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. 80);
Walker's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392. Therefore,
after the death of either party, the marriage is considered to all intents and purposes as valid.
A man has the natural right to marry,
but public policy requires the enactment of safeguards. The state may forbid
marriage between cousins, since medical
evidence handed down has sufficiently
established the fact that such marriage
results in degeneracy and mental weakness. If cousins marry contrary to such
law, the invalidity of such act may only
bt shown prior to the death of husband or
wife. The mal chooses; if a crime, he is
the criminal.
The children are not only innocent, but
inay suffer in member or organs, resulting
bfrom pre-natal crime, for which it would
e a monstrous injustice to punish the
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by disinheriting. The right of estate from
the father may even inure through the
mother, though she be a particepscriminiM, hence, she too inherits, because of the
children.
Judgrment in favor of plaintiff, for full
amount, ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.
VERA, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIE COURT.

Prior to the act of June 24th, 1901, P. L.
597, marriage between first cousins was
valid. Marriage of persons bearing that
relation was not made incestuous by the
act of 1705, 1 Lm. L. 26; nor by that of
March 31st, 1860, 1 P. & L. 1222. The act
of 1901 declares that it "shall be unlawful" for such persons to be joined in marriage, and by the 2nd section all marriages
between them are "declared void."
The act of March 13th, 1815, after declaring marriages between persons "within the degree of consanguinity or affinity,"
according to the table established by law,
"void to all intents and purposes," adds
that "when such marriages shall not have
been dissolved during the lifetime of the
parties, the unlawfulness of the same
shall not be inquired into after the death
of either the husband or wife." This provision was supposed still to cleave to the
law concerning incestuous marriage, as
late as 1872, although the act of 1860 did
not contain it. [It is to be observed that
the tables of consanguinity and affinity of
the act of 1860 and those of the prior act
are exactly the same]. Walker's Appeal,
70 Pa. 392. Cf. Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa.
309. The act of 1815 not being repealed
by the act of 1860, is not repealed by that
of 1901. The expression according to the
table established by law, "refers to any
table, that from time to time, may be
established by law." We think the court
below properly concluded that the effect
of a marriage between cousins would be
the same as one between uncle and niece,
or aunt and nephew. There is no imaginable reason for making the former liable
to attack after death, while making the
latter invulnerable after death of one of
the parties.
The parties, Wood and Hughes, were
residents of Carlisle, and weit to Maryland for the purpose of being there married
and of evading the law of this state.
They returned immediately and continued

to reside here until the death of John
Wood. To such a marriage, the law of
this state attaches as much as if it had
been made in Pennsylvania, so far as our
tribunals and property within their jurisStull's Estate,
diction, are concerned.
183 Pa. 125.
But, the marriage is not assailed. What
is denied is the validity of the ante-nuptial
contract. The deceased promised before
marriage to pay to Sarah Hughes $10,000,
she agreeing to relinquish her share in his
estate. This contract contemplated and
stipulated for a marriage in contravention
of the policy of this state. It was in part
executed by the following marriage, but
other parts of it remain unexecuted. The
money to be paid by John Wood, has not
been paid. Sarah's refraining from claiming from his estate has continued down to
the present moment, but may not continue longer. The marriage not being
voidable since John's death, she has the
right to take a portion of his estate, unless
she has by a valid contract relinquished
it. It ddes not follow, in our opinion,
from the post mortem immunity of the
marriage from attack, that the preliminary contract possesses such immunity.
The marriage was the partial performance
of the ante-nuptial contract, but partial
performance of an illegal contract does not
make performance of the unperformed
portions, compellable.
The contract was highly reprehensible.
Had no marriage followed in consequence
of the refusal of Wood, it would have
sustained no action by Sarah Hughes for
its breach. The fact that a marriage followed does not make it any better. The
causes which induced the legislature to
give a post mortem validity to marriage,
can be appreciated. To refuse it would
be a hardship to children, who would be
bastardized, and if treated as legal as to
them, no sufficiently good purpose to be
subserved, would justify the treating it as
illegal, as to the surviving mother or
father. But we do not see that there is
any good reason for exempting the antenuptial contract from the ordinary consequences of illegality.
It follows, that while Mrs. Hughes may
claim from her husband's estate what a
widow is entitled to, the contract made
before marriage cannot be enforced.
Decree reversed, with procedendo.
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Swinton has title to the property in dispute, and could recover in his action.
Fraudulentconveyances-iStatute offrauds But it is incumbent upon him to establish
-Conveyance made to another with a either by direct proof, or by facts sufficient
covenant to pay the delits of the grantor. to warrant a presumption of its existence
clearly proved, that the transfer was
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
fraudulent. Jones v. Lewis, 148 Pa. 234.
John Trollope was considerably indebted
To sone conveyances, such as are made
and feeble. He transferred his personal by a debtor of a large and material part of
property to his son, Arthur, in considerahis estate, without any equivalent, or for
tion that Arthur should pay all the debts. such as is grossly inadequate, the statute
These amounted to $2,500, and the person- imputes fraud. Courts presume they were
alty was worth from $2,00 to $2,500. made to delay, hinder or defraud creditors.
Swinton, a credior of Trollope, asserting Sliontz v. Brown, 27 Pa. 130. It must be
that the transfer was void as to him, a very clear case where such a presunipcaused a ft. fa. for $240, to be levied on
tion will arise. In later cases we find that
two horses embraced in the transfer. The "fraud is never to be presumed, but must
sheriff sold them and Swinton became the be proved by evidence that is clear and
purchaser. This is replevin to recover
satisfactory to thejury." Collins v. Cronin,
possession, the defendant having taken 117 Pa.
*5.
the horses after the sheriff's sale, from
However, in the present case, the transSwinton's possession.
fer from the father to the son was for a
JAMES for plaintiff.
valuable consideration. The son assumed
The contract though valid between the an obligation to pay debts amounting to
parties is void as to creditor, not a party
to it. Shoemaker v. King. 40 Pa. 107; $2,500, wbile the personal property he received was worth from $2,000 to $2,500,
Allshouse v. Ramsey, 6 Wharton 331;
Muller v. Long, 45 Pa. .450; Bailey v. the very highest value being no more than
Marshall, 174 Pa. 602.
the debts. In Rechting v. Byers, 94 Pa.
DIvELY and KLNAPPENBERGER for de- 316, we have dicta to the effect that where
fendant.
the property conveyed is not worth more
Plaintiff mast establish the fraud, it
will not be presumed. The mere fact that than the existing indebtedness, it would
the conveyance was between father and be difficult to conceive a case in which
son will not raise a presumption of fraud.
fraud under the statute of 13 Eliz. could
A promise to pay debts of the grantor is a be established.
good consideration. Patterson v. Stewart,
Does the fact that the transaction was
6 W. & S. 72; Shontz v. Brown, 27 Pa.
123; Preston v. .Jones, 50 Pa. 54; Mead v. between father and son change the legal
Conrae, 113 Pa. 220.
position of the parties? Business dealings
OPINION OF THE COURT.
between parents and children and otier
In an action of replevin, the plaintiff near relatives were at one time looked upmust show that he is entitled to exclusive on as fraudulent, but now their conduct is
possession as against the defendant. To not to be scrutinized with greater severity
determine the respective righits of Swi n ton
than that of strangers in blood. Pattison
and Trollope, two questions present them- v. Stewart, 6 W. & S. 72; Brown's Appeal,
selves for consideration : First, was the 86 Pa. 524. Where the bonafides of their
transfer from John Trollope to Arthur transaction is attacked the fraud alleged
Trollope in defraud of creditors? Second, must be clearly proved. Rechting v. Byers,
even if it was not, does itcome within the 94 Pa. 316; Brown v. McCormick, 135 Pa.
434. In Pattison v. Stewart, the court inStatute of Frauds?
The statute of 13 Eliz. declares all con- structed the jury that "if they believed
veyances and dispositions of property, that the deed was made by the father to
his sons in considerat on of an agreement
real and personal, made with the intent
or purpose of delaying, hinderiug or de- on their part to pay the father's debts, it
frauding creditors, to be void. This statute was a good and valid consideration, and
this conveyance was not fraudulent as to
has been recognized in numerous decisions
the creditors," which was affirmed in the
in Pennsylvania. If the transfer of John
Trollope to Arthur Trollope is void, then Supreme Court.

SWINTON vs. TROLLOPE.
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We, therefore, hold that the transfer
interest or purpose of his own, notwithfrom JohnTrollopetohisson, Arthur, was
standing the effect is to pay or discharge
not within the statute of 13 Eliz., and that
the debt of another, his promise Is not
Arthur Trollope thereby obtained a good
within the statute. Also the promise must
title to the property.
be collateral to a continued liability of the
The rule of caveat emptor applies in
original debtor. Maule v. Bucknell, 50
sheriff's sales.
Wells v. Van Dyke, 106
Pa. 52; Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 480.
Pa. 111 ; Smith v. Painter, 5 S. & R. 223.
The statute is not set up as a defence by
Therefore, the plaintiff by purchasing the defendant, to whom it is certainly meant
property at sheriff's sale, acquired the
as a defence. He does not attempt to set
property John Trollope had at the time
up the illegality of the transfer. He does
of sale. Swinton levied upon these two
not deny his obligation to pay the debts
horses as the property of John Trollope,
of his fattier, and that his obligation is the
claiming at the time that the conveyance
primary one.
from John Trollope to his son was void as
While we claim that this contract does
to him. There is nothing in the case to
not come within the Statute of Frauds,
show that ArthurTrollope is estopped from
this question does not have any bearing
claiming the goods. By the word transfer
whatever in the decision of this case. The
we would infer that Arthur Tiollope had statement of facts says nothing about the
possession of the property at time of levy.
form of agreement between John Trollope
Why the sheriff was not required to resort
and the defendant, and where nothing is
to his interpleader, we do not know, so we
said, transactions are always presumed to
must presume there was a just cause. Per- meet the legal requirements. Swinton
haps the property was sold without dehas a remedy against Arthur Trollope to
fendant's knowledge or when it was imrecover the amount of his judgment, but
possible for him to give the sheriff notice
the proper one is not replevin.
of his claim.
To hold otherwise might work injustice
A man is entitled to the possession of
to the creditors, the debtor, and also the
his property, and he can regain possession
vendee of Ihe debtor. Very probably
of property that has been wrongfully taken
Arthur Trollope would rather pay full
or detained from him, so long as he does
value for the property than have it sacrinot resort to violence or unlawful means.
ficed at a sheriff's sale. Also, perhaps, that
There is nothing to show that Arthur
specific property was of special value to
Trollope did not so retake possession of
him. To hold that this transfer was not
these two horses.
good against creditors would seem to deThe plaintiff to further his claim argued
prive the debtor of the only means that he
thatan action could not bebroughtagainst
had of paying them. The transfer points to
Arthur Trollope on the contract entered
anything but fraud on the part of the
into between John Trollope and defenddebtor. If it had not been made, If he had
ant, as against provision of act of 1855.
made an assignment for the benefit of
This act provides that "no action shall be creditors, or if he had gone into voluntary
brought whereby to charge the defendant,
or involuntary bankruptcy, it is clear that
upon any special promise, to answer for
injustice would be done to both debtor and
the debt or default of another, unless the creditors. Judgment for defendant.
agreement upon which such action shall
CHAPMAN, J.
be brought, or some memorandum or note
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
thereof, shall be in writing and signed by
The plaintiff, a purchaser at the sherliffs
the party to be charged therewith, or by
sale of the horses, has instituted this resome other person by him authorized."
plevin, to recover them from Arthur TrolThis statute has given rise to much litigalope. John Trollope had owned persontion and there is still a diversity of opinion
alty, including these horses, to the value
as to what it really comprises. The real
of $2,000 to $2,500. He was also indebted to
intention of the statute is to relieve an
the extent of $2,500. He transferred this
alleged guarantor or surety.
Bailey v.
property to his son, Arthur, in consideraMarshall, 174 Pa. 602. When the leading
tion of Arthur's assuming to pay these
object of the promisor is to subserve some
debts.
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This is not a voluntary conveyance.
The promise of Arthur to pay $2,500 was a
full consideration for a transfer of property
which was barely worth so much.
Had John sold the property to Arthur
for $2.500, no one would contest the soundness of the transaction. It would not have
been necessary that the money should be
paid in cash. A reasonable credit would
have been permissible. The obligation to
pay is as much a consideration as presently
paying. Instead of requiring Arthur to
pay, in a reasonably short time, $2,500 to
himself, John has required him, within
that time, to pay it in portions to his
creditors. How can the difference affect
injuriously the creditors? If Arthur had
paid him, he might or might not have paid
them. Arthur has contracted himself to
pay them. There is only one risk for tie
creditors instead of two. Had the contract been that Arthur should pay John,
there would have been the double doubt
whether Arthur would pay John, and, if
he did, whether John would pay the
creditors. We see no increase of the risk
to creditors of loss of their debts from the
transaction.
It appears that John Trollope was feeble.
He had, probably, but little hope of adding
to his property. He transfers it to his son,
who is younger, and possibly more capable of increasing his wealth. If Arthur
has or gains additional property, creditors
will gain an increase of their security, unless his debts equal that property.
There are transfers of property whose
voidableness by creditors does not depend
on the presence of an intention to defraud,
hinder, or delay creditors. Of these, what
are known as voluntary conveyances are a
specimen.
It may be said with probable accuracy,
that unles the transfer is without consideration, or unless the consideration is
conspicuously inadequate, the transfer will
not be voidable unless produced in part,
by the desire to hinder or defraud creditors. Fraud in fact must be present.
Shontz v. Brown, 27 Pa. 123.
The presence of such an intention on the
part of the grantor, ifknown to thegrantee,
will make any conveyance voidable by
creditors, whether it be for, cash, or for
bonds and notes, or for an undertaking to
paydebts. But, thisintention beingabsent,
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the adoption of one form of consideration
instead of another, will not make the conveyance vulnerable. When the grantee
undertakes to pay existing debts in a
reasonable time, and is not shown to have
debts of his own which would make his
undertaking precarious, i. e. when the
consideration is adequate, the conveyance
will not be voidable, unless a covinous intent is discerned. Shontz v. Brown, 27
Pa. 123; Stafford v. Stafford, 27 Pa. 144;
Drum v. Painter, 27 Pa. 148; Preston v.
Jones, 50 Pa. 54; Pattison v. Stewart, 6 W.
& S. 72.
Such an arrangement does not withdraw
the property from the reach of the creditors. It is true that they can no longer
gain a lien upon it by obtaining judgment
against the debtor. They cannot levy
upon it and sell it. The cases are not
harmonious, as to the right of C to bring a
suit on B's promise to A to pay C a sum
of money, in consideration of A's transfer
of property to B. Cf. cases cited in 3 P. &
L. 4324. We cannot, now, examine these
cases. In Pattison v. Stewart, 6 W. & S.
72, the right of C, the creditor, to sue B.
the grantee, on B's promise to pay A,
the grantor's debts are recognized, Kennedy, J., remarking, "John M1'Clure, the
son, if a creditor at the time his father
conveyed the land to William and James,
might have sued the latter [who had
ptomised to pay the father's debts] and,
after having obtained judgment against
them, for the amount of his claim, have
taken the land in execution, provided
they still held it under the deed." That
the creditor has such right, is apparently
conceded, in Drum v. Painter, 27 Pa. 148.
Cf. 3 P. & L. Dig. Dec. 4339, et seq.
But if the creditor cannot sue the debtor's
grantee, either in his own name, or in that
of the grantee, he can sue the debtor, and
on the judgment obtained attach the
money in the hands of the grantee. It is
true that this method is not quite so expeditious as a suit against the holder of the
land would be, but the attachment can
issue immediately upon recovery of the
judgment, and a lien on realty or personalty can be obtained practically as soon.
Judgment affirmed.
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JANE IRWIN'S ESTATE.
Decedent's estates-Petitionfoe an order
to sell real estate- Quality and quantity
of debts necessary to warrant the order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mrs. Irwin died leaving land but no
personalty. Her husband as administrator, petitioned the Orphans' Court for
authority to sell the real estate, naming
as debts, one for groceries and for dry
goods furnished the family, the undertaker's bill for the burial of the deceased,
the druggist's and physician's bill, and a
note for two hundred and forty dollars,
($240.U0), of which the petitioner was the
maker and the decedent payee and endorser. The note had been dishonored a
week before the death of Mrs. Irwin and
due notice thereof given to her. The
guardian of the only child of the deceased
objects to the petition.
WILSoN and WImLIS for petitioners.
If there is no personal property of the
decedent, one debt will be sufficient to
award the petition to sell the realty. Act
of 1834, P. & L. Digest 14S4; Weber's Estate, 20 Phila. 8; Keiper v. Helfricker, 42
Pa. 329 ; Sawtelle's Appeal, 84 Pa. 306.
AIJERTSON and FLYNN, contra.
The decedent's estate not being liable
for any of the debts mentioned in the
petition, the order of sale cannot be granted. Webster's Estate, 25 W. N. C. 22.5;
Walsch's Estate, 166 Pa. 205 ; Roll v. Dawson, 165 Pa. 392; Wheeler's Estate, 4 Dist.
R. 265; lBerger v. Clark, 79 Pa. 340.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

To support his petition for a decree
authorizing a sale of his wife's realty, the
petitioner presents a list of debts as follows: For dry goods and groceries furnished the family; for medical attendance
and medicine during her last illness ; for
the expenses of her burial; for a note that
was made payable to her by her husband
and endorsed by her. He asks that his
wife's separate estate be held for all of the
above debts.
For the purpose of properly disposing of
this esse, we shall consider the above bills
separately.
For the dry goods and groceries, "furnished the family," we are of the opinion
that the wife's separate estate cannot be
held. If she contracted these debts, her
estate, of course, could beheld. ActofJune

8, 1893, P. L. 344. But, if they were furnished for the support and maintenance of
his family, he is liable. 7 S. & R. 247; 10
W. N. C. 240.
It does not appear that they were furnished at the request of the wife; neither
does it appear that they were furnished at
the request of some other person on her
credit and at her permission. On the contrary, it would be reasonable to infer that
they were furnished on the credit of the
husband. His conduct would lead one to
infer as much. He refused to pay his note
when due; he refuses to pay for the food
and clothes furnished his family; he refuses
to pay the druggist and doctor who attended his wife in her last illness ; and he
refuses to pay the undertaker who gave
her decent burial.
His conduct is, in our opinion, reprehensible, and exhibits a character so mercenary that neither the memory of his
dead wife, nor the rights of his living
child, would dissuade him from resorting
to any scheme whereby he could escape
the payment ofa debt. Therefore, nothing
appearing to indicate that the goods were
furnished at the request of the wife or on
her personal credit, we cannot decree a
sale of the realty for them.
The next class of debts that we have to
consider are the druggist's, the doctor's,
and the uudertaker's.
It is settled in
Pennsylvania that for bills of this class
the husband is primarily liable, and the
wife only when the husband Is insolvent.
Walseh's Estate, 166 Pa. 205; Castigan's
Estate, 13 Phila. 264; Darmody's Estate,
13 Phila. 207; McCormick's Estate, 4 Kulp,
15.
The question, therefore, for us to consider
is the solvency of the husband. If he is
solvent, the wife's estate is not liable; if
he is insolvent it is. In our opinion, it
would be as reasonable to infer insolvency
as solvency from the facts. Here we have
a man who permits his paper to go to protest, who refuses to pay for the food and
clothing furnished his family, who refuses
to pay for the drugs and medical attendance furnished his wife in her last illness,
who refuses to pay for the expenses incurred in giving her decent burial. Such
acts are not those of an honorable and
solvent man. The first thing usually,
that such a man would do after the burial
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of his wife, would be to pay these debts.
On the other hand, we can see reasons
from which to infer solvency. He might
be solvent and yet do all these things. He
might have many motives for permitting
his paper to go to protest, and refusing to
pay the other bills. Perhaps his motive
in refusing to pay the note was fraud,
perhaps his motive in refusing to pay his
bills was to compel his wife's estate to
pay regardless of his financial condition.
One inference would be as reasonable as
the other. We, therefore, shall make no
inference, but shall decree a sale of the
realty as to them and when the fund is being distributed the question of his solvency
can be determined.
The liability of the wife's estate for the
note was the question at which the learned
gentlemen who argued the case directed
their forcible arguments. The counsel
representing the guardian contend that
the wife is an accommodation endorser
and under the act of '93 is not liable. The
counsel for petitioner argue that she was
not, but was an endorser in the regular
course of business. With the latter we
agree. The act of 1901, art. 11, see. 29,
defines an accommodation endorser to be
"any one who has signed the instrument
as maker, drawer, acceptor, or endorser,
without receiving value thereof and for
purpose of lending his name to some other
person."
The same act, sec. 24, provides every
negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration, and every person whose
signature appears thereon to have been a
party thereto for value." The latter clause,
we think, governs the note under consideration. Prima facie, the wife is an
endorser for value, and nothing appearing
to rebut that, we must declare her estate
liable.
Therefore, we decree a sale of so much of
the realty as may be necessary to pay the
druggist, the doctor, the undertaker, and
the person claiming on the note. At the
distribution of the fund the question of the
husband's solvency and liability for the
former debts can be determined.
WALSH, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Among the debts mentioned in the
schedule accompanyingithe petition of the

administrator, is a note drawn by Win.
Irwin, payable to his wife, Jane, and by
her endorsed. If this was a contrivance
by which she became'surety or guarantor
for him, and if the holder of the note was
aware of this fact, she would not be liable
upon it to him, and hence a sale of her
land could not be properly ordered to effect
its payment. But, no evidence has been
offered, nor has it even been alleged, that
such is the nature of the note. Apparently,
the money mentioned in the note was due
from Win. Irwin to Jane Irwin, and when
she endorsed it, she obtained the consideration from the endorsee. To secure payment to him, her land can be sold, although Win. Irwin is also liable for the
same debt.
Some of the debts specified in the
schedule, are for groceries and dry goods
furnished the family. It is the husband's
duty to supply those articles to the family.
It does not appear by whom they were
ordered. Even if by her, the presumption
would be, until the contrary was shown,
that she ordered them as his agent, and
that the furnisher of them gave him and
not her, the credit, Hogan's Estate, 181
Pa. 500, 515 ; Hoff v. Koerper, 103 Pa. 396 ;
Berger v. Clark, 79 Pa. 340. And though
she might be sued under the act of 1848,
jointly with her husband, if she ordered
the goods and upon her own credit, execution could not issue against her, until
the husband's insolvency appeared.
Others of the debts are that for drugs,
that for the physician's, and that for the
undertaker's services. These are necessaries which it is the duty of the husband
to supply. It does not appear that he did
not order them. It is quite certain that
Mrs. Irwin did not procure the services of
the undertaker. If the husband ordered
them, as, in the absence of evidence, we
must presume, we are not to take for
granted that he acted as agent for her.
Without her request for the services, her
estate, it is held, is not liable for physician's
fees. Sawtelle's Appeal, 84 Pa. 307; Cf.
Moore v. Copley, 165 Pa. 294; and even
after such request, she is liable only on her
husband's Insolvency. Castigan's Estate,
13 Phila. 264.
There are cases which seem to hold
that the estate of the wife is.liable for
physician's and undertaker's fees, though
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not ordered by the wife on her credit, if
the husband is unable to pay them. Judd's
Estate, 9 Kulp, 326; Wanhoup's Estate,
29 P. L. J. 2556 ; Walsch's Estate, 166 Pa.
204; Scott's Estate, 15 Pa. 0. C. 316; but
before the Orphans' Court will order a sale
of the wife's land for their payment, the
husband's inability to pay them must be
made to appear. McCormick's Estate, 4
Kulp., 15.
As to the undertaker's fee, the wife is
dead before any contract is made with
him. Some one has a right to contract
for her burial, at the expense of her estate,
but even if the administrator pays the fee,
he has a right to reimbursement from the
husband, whose primary duty is to beat
the expense. Darmody's Estate, 13 Phila.
207 ; Weber's Estate, 20 Phila. 8. In the
case before us, the husband became the
administrator. It is probable that he requested the services of the undertaker. If
he obtained them on his own credit, the
wife's estate did not become indebted. It
ought to appear that when he made the
contract with the undertaker, the latter
stipulated for recourse to the decedent's
estate. We are bound to suppose that the
husband as such, hired the services, and,
as hirer, is exclusively liable. Nor, if
the mere fact of his insolvency would
create an extra-contractual liability on
the decedent's estate, does that insolvency
appear. So important a fact should be
distinctly alleged in the petition, and, if
denied by the objectors to the order to
sell, should be established by more satisfactory evidence than what appears in
this case.
Appeal dismissed.

time, and John survived him. In the distribution of the estate, John claims all
under the note. The estate is now worth
$4,200.
JONES and KEELOR for plaintiff.
A note, under seal, payable after the
death of the maker, in the absenceof fraud
or duress, requires no consideration. Ross'
Appeal, 127 Pa. 4; Candor's Appeal, 27
Pa. 119; Mack's Appeal, 68 Pa. 231; Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215.
DRUMHELLER and PEIGHTEL for defendant.
Natural love and affection are not a sufficient consideration to sustain a promissory note. Daniel on Neg. Inst., See. 179;
Chitty on Bills, See. 85; Jones v. Lock,
L. R. Ch. Appeal 25.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
Smithson gave his son this note, and although the object was to give the son the
entire estate, it does not appear what
prompted the father to enter into this
transaction. This state of mind and his
conduct in creating the obligation in his
son's favor are matters that cannot well be
inquired into. The note is under seal, but
it is alleged there was no consideration for
it. A note by a father to a son, without
consideration, is void as to creditors, but a
different rule will prevail to persons who
have no better equity in the estate than
the father. A father can always give his
property to whomever he pleases, provided he does not do so with a view to
defraud any person. It does not appear
there was any such intention in this transaction. If the note had been given in
contemplation of marriage, with a view of
depriving the future wife of her rights,
she would have a valid defence to its collection, but this fact does not appear;
neither does it appear how soon after the
giving of this note the decedent married,
PHILIP SMITHSON'S ESTATE.
and as the burden is on the wife to show
into in
Decedent's estates- Gifts- Consideration that the transaction was entered
contemplation of her marriage to Smithnot necessary.
son, and she has failed to offer any eviSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
dence to prove this fact, we feel justified
in deciding that she has no such defence.
Smithson five (5) years before his death,
It is argued by the counsel for the degave to his son, John, a note, under seal,
fendant, that the note is testamentary in
for $10,000, payable at the maker's death.
character, and is avoided by the act of
There was no consideration for it, and the
With this we fail to agree. Al1883.
object was to give John the entire estate.
no particular form is necessary to
though
of
makSince that the estate, at the time
constitute a will, yet the intention, to some
ing the note or since, never exceeded in
degree, must appear on the instrument
After making the note,
value, $5,000.
itself. A will may take the form of a note
Smithson, a widower, married a second
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a deed, a power of attorney, and in fact
almost any form, if the intention of the
person who executed it can be collected
from the instrument; it is the intention of
the maker and not the form of the iustrument that must govern. 51 Pa. 126.
The form of the present instrument is
that of a promise to pay a certain sum of
money on a future contingency. The fact
that there is evidence that the intention
of the father was to give the son the entire estate is not sufficient to change the
character of the instrument. Had there
been no seal to the note, or no consideration mentioned in it, this might be regarded as evidence that it was to operate
as a will and not as an obligation contractual in form. Had there been a consideration mentioned in the note, even
though it was under seal, it could be shown
that in fact there was no consideration,
but since the instrument is under seal,
without mention that it was given for a
consideration. evidence cannot be introduced to show that'in fact there was no
consideration. 171 Pa. 633.
We regard the instrument as an obligation, the consideration of which cannot be
inquired into, and the case is within the
ruling of 8 Yeates 389. The son is entitled
to the estate subject to the widow's rights,
under the act of 1849, which permit her to
retain $300 worth of property.
DEvER,

J.

the doner obliges himself before death, to
give at death, the transaction isnota will,
but a contract. Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa.
119, etc.
The gift might have, for one of its objects,
the preference of the donee to the widow
of the donor. The wife has no such interest
in the husband's personalty as prevents
his alienating it without her consent.
Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281. But, when
a man has a wife, who, he knows, will
take one-third or one-half of his personalty
at his death, and he gives away a portion
of his personalty, the gift taking effect in
his lifetime, or at his death, he knows
that he, by so much, reduces the fund in
which his wife or widow is to share. What
he knows to be the result, he must intend.
Yet, every intention to diminish the fund
remaining for distribution at death among
widow and others, is not a fraud upon her
and them. Ross' Appeal, 127 Pa. 4. But,
some intentions will be such fraud. Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215. It is not now
necessary to attempt the distinction between them. As the learned court below
remarks, there is no evidence of an intention to defraud any wife, when the bond
was made by Smithson. He had no wife,
nor are we informed how long afterwards
it was before he married. She acquired
the rights of wifesubject to the pre-existing
rights of others.
Decree affirmed.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It is possible for A to oblige himself to
give to B a sum of money. Ordinarily a
gift must be executed in order to be indefeasible. Promises to give are not enforceable. But when the promise is put in the
form of a bond, or single bill, no consideration is necessary, and an obligation attaches to the donor to perform. Candor's
Appeal, 27 Pa. 119; Mlack's Appeal, 68 Pa.
231; Ross' Appeal 127 Pa. 4; Luebbe's Estate, 179 Pa. 447; Hummel's Estate, 161
Pa. 215.
The gratuitous promise to pay a sum of
money in the future, is enforceable, when
it is under seal. The time selected for payment, may be ascertainable by consulting
the calendar only; or it may be individualized by an event. The event may be the
donor's death. The fact that the money
is not to be paid until the donor's death,
does not make the gift testamentary. If

SNIVEN vs. WALPOLE.
Negotiable instruments-Promissory-note
signed with spaces-Liability of one
maker when another maker hasfraudulently alteredthe paper.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thomas Ferrin desired to borrow $100,
and induced Walpole to become security.
The note when presented to Walpole for
his signature, read thus: "Nine months
after date we severally promise to pay
one hundred
dollars, value received, to the order of Thomas Ferrin."
It was signed by Thomas Ferrin and below
his signature by Walpole. Subsequently,
and without the consent of Walpole,
Ferrin inserted "forty" before the words
"one hundred" and "seventy-five" after
them, so that the note purported to be for
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$4175. He borrowed this sum from Sniven,
who had no suspicion of the alteration.
Walpole denies any liability.

FORUM

Fox and

SHBRBINE

for plaintiff.

Where a maker signs a note in such
form that it can be altered without raising
any suspicion, he is answerable to a bona
fide holder for full altered value. Whdre
one of two injured parties must lose, the
one whose negigence has made the fraud
possible must bear the loss. Zimmerman
v. Rote, 75 Pa. 188; Howe v. Lewis, 14
Sup. 232; Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. 82;
Penn. R. R's. Appeal, 85 Pa. 80.
WALSH and LONGBOTTOM for defendant.
A note altered with consent on one
maker, is binding on him for altered value,
but not on co-maker. Nor will it be enforceable against an endorser. Where an
instrument has been materially altered
and is in the hands of a bonafide holder,
not a party thereto, he may enforce payment according to original tenor of the
instrument. Act of 1901, P. L. 211, sec.
124; Barry v. Halreen, 4 Wharton 17;
Craig v. McLoney. 99 Pa. 211.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action, of assumpsit on a negotiable instrument against the endorser.
Before the note was endorsed, it was so
filled in that there was space left for the
addition of other words. These spaces
were filled in by the maker of the note
after it was endorsed. The note in its
altered form is received by Sniven, who
had no suspicion of the fraud. He brings
action against the endorser.
The decisions in regard to the liability
of an endorser, where the maker has fraudulently changed the paper, are not uniform. In Massachusetts, New York, Michigan and Iowa, the doctrine seems to be
that the endorser is not liable.
In Holmes v. Trumbe, 22 Mich. 427, in
an opinion in which Justices Campbell,
Graves, and Cooley concurred, it was held
that a person who signs a promissory note,
however awkwardly drawn it might be,
should be protected against forgery by
alteration of the instrument; that persons must take such paper on their own
risk, so far as the question of forgery is
concerned; that they must trust in the
character and credit of those from whom
they receive the paper.
In Granfield Savings Bank v. Stowell,
123 Mass., decided in 1877, it was said:
"Alteration avnids the note as to makers
who do not consent thereto, even in the

hands of bona fide holders."
In this
opinion Justice Gray criticises the Pennsylvania cases. He says: "The later Pennsylvania cases seem to be both inconsistent and unsatisfactory, both in their
reasoning and in their results." The cases
thus referred to are evidently Garrard v.
Haldam, 67 Pa.; Zimmerman v. Rote, 75
Pa., and Brown v. Reed, 79 Pa. In these
cases it was held that the payee cannot
collect from the makers, especially if he
was negligent in receiving paper that was
perceptibly changed.
However, if the makers allowed the
paper to pass from their hands in such a
negligent condition that it could easily be
raised to a higher sum, then it seems negligence would be attributed to them and
they would be held liable. This doctrine
was also advanced in Less v. Walls, 101
Pa. 57. In Gettysburg National Bank v.
Chisholm, 169 Pa., a material change was
made by adding "with interest at 6 per
cent." This was held to make the note
absolutely void against innocent parties,
to the note. In that case it was said that
the rule of public policy which insures
the protection of such an instrument from
fraud and substitution will prevent recovery.
The question of negligence enters into
each case. In Pennsylvania, the doctrine
seems to have been pretty well settled that
negligence of the makers will be sufficient
cause for allowing recovery. Forinstance,
if they leave such space as can be easily
filled in, and the note or instrument made
to speak a different language from what it
was intended.
Garrard v. Haddan, 67
Pa. ; Leas v. Walls, 101 Pa.
But there are a line of cases that hold
differently. Tn Exchange National Bank
v. Little Rock National Bank, 58 Fed.
Rep., page 140, J. Sanborn said: "Where
the drawer hax issued a note complete in
itself, but in such a form as to be easily
altered without attracting attention, and
it is afterwards fraudulently raised by a
third person and then bought by an innocent purchaser, it is not his negligence,
but the crime of the forger, that is the
proximate cause of the loss."
This doctrine is also held in Iowa, Massachusetts, Indiana and Maryland.
In
Warrell v. Ghen, 39 Pa., J. Lowrie seems
to have held a different doctrine from
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most of the Pennsylvania decisions. In
that case he held that the endorser should
be held to the original amountof the note.
In Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa., it was decided
that not even the original amount could
be collected from an endorser. This seems
to be the position taken in Greenleaf on
Evidence, I Gr. on Ev., page 565. He
holds that by forfeiting the instrument
the motive for fraud is removed.
The doctrine advanced by the plaintiff
that "where one of two innocent parties
must suffer by the act of a third, he who
has enabled such third to occasion the loss,
must sustain it," is generally.denied in
these cases. McGrath v. Clark, 56 N. Y.
There, therefore, appears to be two lines
of decisions. The one supported by Massachusetts, New York, Iowa and Michigan,
holding that an innocent purchaser of a
materially changed negotiable instrument,
cannot enforce payment in any event,
against an innocent party to the instrument.
Tile other line of decisions, of which
Pennsylvania is the leading state, hold
that a materially changed instrument is
avoided only when the makers have been
free from negligence; but if they do not
use care in filling up blank spaces both
the maker and endorsers will be liable.
The Pennsylvania cases also seem to hold
that if the payees take an idstrumeut that
bears on its face the signs of being tampered with, that they accept such paper
at their peril.
We now see how the statute of 1901
affects the principles settled by these
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court.
The first section of the act provides:
"Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without assent of all the
parties thereto or liable thereon, it is
avoided except as against a party who
has himself made or authorized or assented
to alterations, and to subsequent endorsers.
The -section provides, "But when an instrument has been materially altered and
is in the hands of a holder in due course
of business not a party thereto, or to the
alteration, he may enforce payment thereto, according to the original tenor of the
instrument." Sec. 124 P. L. 1901, P. 211.
The first section evidently means that a
person who materially alters a negotiable
instrument forfeits all his rights against
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innocent parties to the instrument. The
second section says that if the instrument
is changed and gets to the hands of innocent purchasers for value that they can
enforce it against innocent persons there
to, to the amount of the original instrument, or according to its original meaning; for the change may be in date, rate
of interest, or names. The statute would
seem to follow the Massachusetts decisions,
in that negligence of makers gave the
holder no greater rights. It followed the
Pennsylvania decision of Worrell v. Ghen,
in 39 P., in that it permits a recovery according to the original instrument.
In view of the foregoing facts, we give
judgment for the value of the note as
signed by Walpole.
CISNEY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Prior to tile act of 1901, an unauthorized
alteration of a note made it void as to
maker or prior endorser, unless the form
of the note was negligently conducive to
the alteration, and the alteration could
not have been discovered by the holder,
had he exercised proper care. Negligence
in the maker or endorser, made him liable
for the note as altered, as to a bonafide
holder who acquired it without negligence.
Leas v. Walls, 101 Pa. 57; Brown v. Reed,
79 Pa. 370.
Cf. Phelan v. Moss, 67 Pa.
59; Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. 82; Howie
v. Lewis, 14 Super 232.
The note in suit had considerable blank
spaces before and after the words "one
hundred," when Walpole signed it. The
spaces made it feasible for Ferrin to insert
in the first of them the word "forty," and
in the second the words "seventy-five,"
so that Sniven would see nothing upon
tie note to suggest that they had not been
a component of it when Walpole signed
it. Sniven would have had a right to recover $4,175 had the law not been changed.
The 124th section of the act of May 16th,
1901, P. L. 194, 211, avoids a negotiable
instrument, except as to the party who
causes the alteration, or subsequent endorsers, with the exception that, when it
is in the hands of a holder in due course,
not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment of it according to its original
tenor.
The alteration in this note is material.
The "holder" in due course is the payee
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or endorsee of a bill or note, who is in
possession of it. Section 191, act 1901, P.
L. 220. Sniven is then the holder in due
course. He is not a party to the alteration. He did not know of it when he
advanced the money in exchange for it.
He cannot, however, recover what he
thus advanced, from Walpole, although
Walpole's negligence in signing the note
in its actual form, made an undetectable
alteration possible. All he can recover is
the $100 for the payment of which the
note stipulated, when Walpole signed it.
Judgment affirmed.

HOBSON vs. HILTON'S EXECUTORS.

N. Y. 487; Johnson v. Herbell, 10 N. J.
E. 332.

Only actual damages can be recovered.
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418; McNair
v. Crompton, 35 Pa. 23; Trip v. Bishop,
56 Pa. 424; Meason v. Kame, 63 Pa. 335.
YBAGLPEy and KAUFFMIAX for defendant.
A parol contract to devise land cannot
be enforded because it violates Statute of
Frauds. Swash v. Sharpsless, 32 L. R. A.
796; Could v. Mansfield, 103 Mass 408; Hennerly v. Woolworth, 128 Md. 438 ; Eller
v. Coyne, 74 Wise. 176; Dunning v. Carey,
23 N. Y. 308.
There exists here undue influence such
as to deprive Mrs. Hilton of a state of
mind sufficient to enter a contract. Wherefore the contract is void. Campbell v.
Spencer, 2 Binney 129; Hind v. Mloar, 2
Pa. 105; Smith v. Loshman, 145 Pa. 628.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of assumnpsit on an alParolcontractto devise-feasureof damage. for breach thereof-2haritablemin- leged contract to devise property. It seems
istrationm.
that a Mrs. Hilton, who was apparently
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mrs. Hilton, apparently very poor and
old, sought and obtained from a group
of charitable persons calling themselves
"The King's Daughters," aid in food, clothing, fuel, payment of rent. This aid was
rendered through two years, when the
ladies acquired a suspicion that Mrs. Hilton had some property. She denied having any, but said that she would be willing to make a will to them of all she had.
A will was written, naming the ten ladies
of this society as legatees and giving to
them all her property. The will was given
to Mrs. Hobson, plaintiff, to keep for the
group. Their charitable ministrations continued for eighteen months later, but on account of the suspicion as to Mrs. Hilton
having property, would, as she knew, have
ceased, but for the will. Six months later,
Mrs. Hilton made another will revoking
all former wills, and giving all she should
leave to a brother living in Edinburgh,
Scotland.
This is an action on the alleged contract
to devise by Mrs. Hobson and the nine
ladies.
WILLIAmSON and KRxss for plaintiff.
For valuable consideration a person may
renounce her right to dispose of her property by will. American and English
Funcyc, of Law, vol. 18, p. 1017; Brinker
v. Brinker, 7 Pa. 53; Logan v. McGrunn, 12 Pa. 27; Parsell v. Slyker, 40

very old and poor, sought and secured aid
from a group of persons who did charitable
work. They began to suspicion that she
had property of her own and were about
to cease furnishing aid when she agreed to
makea will and leave her property to them.
This it seems sheagreed to do in order that
she might secure further aid from the
ladies. They continued aid to her for about
eighteen months, evidently upon the
strength of her promise to devise. Thus
it appears that there was a parol contract
between the parties. There was present
all the necessary elements to support such
a contract-competent parties, meeting of
minds, subject matter, and consideration.
The ladies fulfilled their part of the contract in furnishing aid fora period of eighteen months, but Mrs. Hilton violated the
contract by devising her property to her
brother by a second will. This second will
was made about six months after the agreement had been made. Evidently, theladies
were furnishing aid at this time. They
were relying on Mrs. Hilton's promise and
would naturally have a right to compensation for a breach of the contract.
The question arises, what can they recover? The counsel for defendant contends
that a parol contract involving realty,
comes within the Statute of Frauds and
Perjuries, and is therefore void. There is a
long line of cases reported in Pennsylvania
bearing upon this subject. In Jack v.
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McKee, 9 Pa. 235, it was held that the contract would be enforced, and that the measure of damages recoverable would be ineasured by the value of the thing to be transferred. This case was overruled in later
cases to the extent that the amount of
damages recoverable-would be measured
by the actual loss to plaintiff. In Bender
v. Bender, 37 Pa., it was held that a parol
contract to devise land which is performed
on the part of the prospective devisee by
supporting the other party and by paying
money, cannot be enforced specifically,
but entitles the prospective devisee to full
compensation for what he has done. In
Lawyers' Reports, annotated, vol. 32, page
796, it was said: "The measure of damages on breach of a contract to make a will,
is the value of that with which the plaintiff has parted, whether in money or services." In Neal's Executors v. Gilmore,
79 Pa., it was held that recovery of services
actually rendered may be had in case of
breach of contract to devise. See also
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa.; Bowser v.
Cessna, 62 Pa.; Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa.
475.
So the principleseems to be well established that, where a person secures benefit
in the way of money or services, promising to compensate by devise or legacy, that
such a promise can be enforced, at least, to
the value of the services rendered, or the
amount of money given.
In view of the foregoing facts, we are of
the opinion that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff.
The amount of damages recoverable
should be measured by the value of the
services rendered during the eighteen
months.
(JISNEY, J.
OPINION OF TITE SUPREIE COURT.

The services rendered to Mrs. Hilton
before the agreement to make a will were
rendered with no expectation by Mrs.
Hoaon, et al., of compensation. But, they
were rendered on an assumption known
by Mrs. Hilton to exist in the minds of
Mrs. Hlobson and her associates, and to be
untrue. The assumption had been inculcated by her intentionally and by false
representations of poverty. It may well be
therefore that, Mrs. Hobson, et al., could,
on the discovery of the deception practiced
on them, recover back what they had fur-

nished. Anderson v. Eggers, 61 N. J.
Eq. 85.
The promise to make a will was made
in order to induce the continuance of the
benefactions. Though no express promise
to continue them seems to have been made,
they were in fact continued, in reliance on
the will, and Mrs. Hilton received them,
knowing that they were rendered in such
reliance. We think the learned court below was justified in holding that these
facts constituted a valid contract.
The trial court has held that the measure of damages is, not what the estate is
worth which, had the will been allowed
to stand, would have become the plaintiff's, but what the services rendered were
worth. Some of the Pennsylvania cases
were contracts for a devise, and it was
held that they must be treated as contracts for a conveyance, for the breach of
which, the value of the land is not the
measure of damages. Neal's Ex. v. Gilmore, 79 Pa. 421; Graham v. Graham, 34
Pa. 475; Kauss v. Kohner, 172 Pa. 481.
But, see Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa. 27;
Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. 53.
In other cases, the property was personalty, but it was held that to make the contract to bequeath enforceable by damages
equal to the value of the property, was to
establish a parol will. Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. 475; Pollock v. Ray, 85 Pa.
428. The justness of this observation may
be doubted. To will is one thing, to contract to will is another. To enforce the
contract to will, is not to establish a will.
A will is unilateral and ambulatory and
to establish it after death is not to impute to it the qualities which spring from
contracts, or to assign to it an antemortem obligatoriness. The will isa means
of transferring at death the testator's estate, and this effect can be accomplished
by a contract as well as by a will. Thus,
a promise to pay $1,000 at the death of
the promiser is not a will, though it secures payment only after death, when a
will would have secured it. A promise to
deliver one third or one half or all of such
estate as the promiser shall have at death,
would be equally a contract. The circumstance that the delivery is to be executed
after death does not make the promise testamentary, nor does the fact that the
volume and identity of the estate to be
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delivered is subject to modification by the
the form of a contract to convey the existdiscretion of the promisor until his death.
ing property in specie, at her death, by
In Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161, the
means of a will.
promise was to "provide and give" a serJudgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
vant "full and plenty" after testator "was
gone," so that "she need not work". After
JOHN COTTON vs. FIRE INSURthe promisor's death, she was permitted to
ANCE COMPANY.
rec6ver $10,000, although, on a quantum
meruit, she could have recovered, for the
last six years of service only, and not one
1ire insurance--Violation of covenant in
quarter of $10,000. Cf. Pollock v. Ray, 85
policy-lortgagee'sright to proceeds of
Pa. 428; Cottrel's Est., 2 W. N. C. 83.
a policy containingprovisionforhisproIn some of the cases in which the meastection.
ure of damages was discussed, the promise
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
of the testator was too vaguely proven to
The policy for $3,000 on house and store
make an express contract. Pollock v. Ray,
contained the stipulation that it would be85 Pa. 428; Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. 283;
come void in case of alienation of the propWalls' Appeal, 111 Pa. 460. In King's
Estate, 150 Pa. 143, a promise to let a leg- erty without notice to the company. At
the taking out of the policy, there was a
acy in an existing will "stand and remortgage of $1,000 on the house, and the
main," was not enforced because of a want
policy stipulated that so much ofthemoney
of consideration for it.
due on the policy should be paid to the
The promise proven in the case before us
mortgagee. Two months after the policy
is, "to make a will to them [Mrs. Hobson
was issued, on threat of an action for damand others] of all she had."
This, we
ages against Cotton, he transferred the
think, means, simply that -rs. Hilton
property to his sister, and two mont]is
would leave, at her death, all she had at
later, she re-transferred it to him. There
the time of making the promise, i. e.
was, in fact, no legal liability on the part
should not diminish it by gift or otherwise
of Cotton. Eleven months after the inbefore or at death, and should cause it. to
surance was effected, the property was debecome their property.
The legacy is
simply the means by which it could be- stroyed. The company paid $1,000 to the
mortgagee, but before it paid the residue
come theirs. We see no good, reason for
to Cotton, learned of his transfer to his sisadopting a different measure of damages
ter. There was a secret understanding
when the contract is to use a will as a
with her that she would re-convey as soon
means of securing ownership, from that
which obtains when the contract is to use as he requested.
WILLis for plaintiff.
a bill of sale, as the means. Brinker v.
Words of doubtful meaning should be
Brinker, 7 Pa. 53. It is to be observed
construed to uphold the policy, and against
that Mrs. Hilton promised all her existing
the company. Wilson v. Conway Ins. Co.,
property, not simply that which might re4 R. I. 156; Lazarus v. Ins. Co., 5 Pick. 76.
main to her at death after intermediate
The conveyance did not violate the policy.
alienations.
She knew its value; the Lane v. Ins. Co., 12 Maine 44; Burkhart v.
Ins. Co., 11 Sup. 291. The plaintiff should
promisees did not. Whatever it was, it
recover notwithstanding the conveyance
was, undiminished, to be made theirs at
to his sister. Hill v. Cumberland V. M.
her death. We know no good reason for not
P. Co., 59 Pa. 474; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Kent 270.
giving compensation for that of which she
SHomo and CooK for defendant.
attempted to deprive them by will. Had
A transfer of property in violation of a
she estimated the value of this property,
covenant in the policy renders the policy
at, say $4,000, and promised to them $4,000
void. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hebard, 95 Pa. 45;
at her death, it would scarcely be conFinley et al. v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 6 Casey
tended that they must be content- with
311; Trash v. Fire Ins. Co., 5 Casey 198;
Desler v. The Ins. Co., 2 Wright 134; Mitquantummeruerunt,with the market value
chell v. Coates, 11 Wright 204. Conditions
of their gifts and services. We see no
in policies against sales, alienations or
valid reason for adopting a different meas- change of interest are reasonable, and
ure, because she chose to give her promise valid. Wassner v. Ins. Co., 109 Pa. 507;
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Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 16 Pel. (U. S.) 195;
Oaks v. Mfg. Ins. Co, 131 Mass. 164. The
transfer to the assured sister violated the
policy. Ins. Co. v. Heeland 95 Pa. 45;
Mevelun v. Ins. Co., 62 Iowa 387; Ayres v.
Ins. Co., 17 Iowa 176; Wilson v. Hill, 3
Met. 65.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This action is based upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant company
to the plaintiff herein upon his house and
store. The policy contained a stipulation
that it was to become void in case of alienation
Did thetransferof the property by Cotton
to his sister amount to an alienation?
The term alienation has a technical, legal meaning, and any transfer which
amounts to an absolute transfer of title is
an alienation of the estate. Marts v. Insurance Co., 44 N. J. L. 481; Canoner v.
Insurance Co., 1 N. Y. 294.
What was Cotton's purpose in making
the transfer, and why did he make the
secret agreement with his sister? Our
answer is, from all the facts in the case,
that he had a fraudulent intent to defeat
his probable creditors. He would have it
appear to all the world that he had disposed
of his entire interest in the property insured, and when all danger of liability to
the plaintiff in the threatened action of
trespass had passed, he would call upon his
sister to re-convey the property to him.
His deed to the sister was absolute on its
face and all interests which Cotton held in
the property passed thereby. The secret
trust between himself and sister could not
have been enforced.
The Statute of
Frauds requires that all declarations and
creations of trusts or confidences in lands,
etc., shall be manifested in writing, etc.
There is nothing in this case to show that
the statute has been complied with.
In Bennis v. Insurance Co., 200 Pa. 340,
there was a secret understanding that the
plaintiff's grantee would re-convey when
requested; when the action was brought
on the policy the plaintiff had title to the
property, but the Court held the evidence
of the understanding between the parties
could not be admitted.
The law of the relation between the insuier and the insured is the policy with all
its clauses, conditions, and stipulations, by
which their mutual rights and liabilities
are measured. Insurance Co. v. Helfenstein, 40 Pa. 289. The plaintiff was bound
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to know the provisions of his contract.
Bennis v. Ins. Co., supra. It expressly
sets out that he should not alienate without consent of company, etc., and if he did,
the policy would be void. Failure to comply with these requirements avoids the
policy. Insurance Co. v. Hepbard, 95 Pa.

45.
But counsel for the plaintiff argues that
inasmuch as the defendant company has
paid the mortgage, $1,000, it has waived
the breach of the condition against alienation; therefore, there can be a recovery.
We can not agree with the learned counsel.
The Court, in Hepbard v. Insurance Co.,
supra,said that where the policy is conditioned to become void by alienation
without consent of insurer, a breach of the
condition terminates the policy without
any formal act or declaration of forfeiture
on the part of the company.
Therefore, as we have found there was
an alienation,the policy became void two
months after it was issued. When the
defendant paid the$1,000 to the mortgagee,
it had no knowledge of the transfer, but
after this payment and before paying the
residue, it learned of the conduct of the
plaintiff, and refused to pay. The money
was paid to the mortgagee under a mistake
and not by reason of any obligation in the
policy. There is no contract between the
mortgagee and the insurer, and the mortgagee can only recover when the mortgagor
could have done so had the money been
payable to himself instead of being payable for his benefit to the mortgagee. Any
breach by the mortgagor of the conditions
of the policy, which would avoid it as to
himself, will also render it void as to the
mortgagee. A. & E. Enc. Law, vol. 13, °
p. 250.-C. C.
Judgment for the defendant.
A LBERTSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Cotton, two months after the policy
was made, transferred his land to his
sister. The understanding between them,
not disclosed in the deed, however, was
that she would re-convey the premises to
him, as soon as he requested. It does not
appear that there was no consideration for
the conveyance.
If there was a consideration, the transaction seems to have been a sale and an
agreement to re-sell. The conveyance was
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an alienation, and is none the less such,
because of the promise to re-convey. Had
the promise to re-convey been in writing,
the conveyance would have been an alienation. A fortiori; is it such, since the
promise was but oral.
If there was no consideration, it may be
urged that the sister took the land under
a trust to hold and re-convey upon demand. But such a trust would be express,
and not being in writing would not be
enforceable. Act April 22d, 1856; 1 P. & L.
2193; Hess' Appeal, 112 Pa. 168; Maffitt v.
Rynd, 69 Pa. 380; Everhart's Appeal, 106
Pa. 349; Barry v. Hill, 166 Pa. 349; Martin
v. Baird, 175 Pa. 540. Cf. Bemis v. Harborcreek Mutual Fire Ins. Co, 200 Pa. 340.
But, though not enforceable, there
might be a reasonable expectation on the
grantor's part, that the grantee would
observe his obligation to re-convey. In
fact Cotton's sister has, as she agreed to
do, re-conveyed. We, nevertheless, think
that his conveyance, stripping him of any
estate which the law would recognize and
substituLing for it a mere possibility of reacquiring an estate, must be considered
as alienation. Not every modification of
the rights of an owner, is an alienation;
not, e. g. the imposing of a mortgage, or
other lien, 1 Biddle Ins. 207; or of a lease,
1 Biddle Ins. 212. West Branch Ins. Co.
v. Helfenstein, 40 Pa. 289.
But, so profound a change of the relation of Cotton,
as was effected by his deed to his sister,
must,, we think, be deemed an alienation.
Qf. Burkhart v. Insurance Co., 11 Super,
280, where it is held that an absolute deed,
intended to be a mortgage will, as respects
the insurance company, be treated as a
mortgage only, notwithstanding the act
of June 8th, 1881. requiring written and
acknowledged defeasances.
The conveyance by Cotton was made
"on threat of an action for damages"
against him. This probably signifies that
the object of Cotton was to withdraw his
land from liability to execution sale, should
the threatened action eventuate in a judgment, and that his sister, in receiving the
deed, was intending to assist him in effecting this object. It is well settled that while
such a conveyance can be treated by creditors of the grantor as null and void, the
grantor himself loses all estate in the land.
By no action, and on no hypothesis, of

contract or of trust, can he recover it from
his grantee.
It seems that the person whom Cotton
expected to sue him, had no legal claim
against him. Cotton, however, thought he
had or might have, and conveyed the land
to defeat the possiblejudgment. Thejudgment would have been conclusive against
him, had one been obtained. Without the
judgment, his land could not be put in
peril. He intended, therefore, to commit a
fraud. We do not think that he can any
more undo a conveyance, made with this
intent wlen the consummation of the
fraud is impossible by the unexpected incapacity of the supposed creditor to obtain
a judgment, than when such judgment is
obtainable.
The land was re-conveyed to Cotton by
his sister, before the fire. But the policy
was to become void in case of alienation
without notice to the company. No exception was made to this operation of the
alienation, when the latter was followed
by a re-acquisition before a fire. Having
become void by the alienation, the policy
did not become valid again by the reacquisition. Bemis v. Harborcreek Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 200 Pa. 340, (reversing 14
Super 528).
Judgment affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH vs. CORNMAN.
Indictment for murder-Records of convictions, assault, burglary and manslaughter not receivable in evidenceDeclarations of a third party out of
court not admissible in evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Indictment for murder. Witness Anderson for defendant testified to an alibi.
He was asked whether he had not told
Loomis that Cornman was at the place of
the murder within a half hour of its commission. He said he had no recollection of
having done so, and did not think he had.
On rebuttal, the Commonwealth was allowed, despite objection, to ask Martin
whether Loomis had made the statement.
Martin said he had. Defendant, on rebuttal, called Anderson to testify that
Loomis had told him, within 10 minutes of
the time Martin said Loomis had made the
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statement, that Cornrnan was not within 3

Loomis is really the witness, yet he is

miles of the place of the crime, when it
was committed. The Commonwealth offered the records of four convictions of
Coruman, two for assault and battery, one
for burglary, and one for voluntary manslaughter. The court admitted them despite objection. This was before Cornman
became a witness. He subsequently became a witness for himself. After his testimony, no attempt was miade by theCommonwealth to impeach his veracity, but
Cornman called 20 witnesses to testify to
his reputation for veracity, on the ground
that the evidence already impeached his
veracity convictions. The court's action
respecting the testimony assigned forerror.
JAcons and GILLESPIE for the Commonwealth.
If jury are satisfied as to prisoner's guilt
his previous good character is of no avail.
9 AtI. 510; 174 Pa. 137.
AMMERMAN and MOREHOUSE for defendant.
It is incompetent upon the trial for one
offence to permit evidence to be given
of another distinct and independent offence. Commonwealth v. Saulsbury, 152
Pa. 554; Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa.
486; Commonwealth v. Barry, 8 C. C. R.
216.
Witness cannot be discredited by
proof prior inconsistent statements, iness such statements are material to the issue. Stahle v. Spahr, 8 S. & R. 317; Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. : Schlaler v.
Winepenny, 75 Pa. 32l.

not responsible for what he says. He is
not subjected to a probe of cross-exaniination, nor is be indictable for perjury if lie
has not told the truth. The rule that a
party put on trial is entitled to have his
case tried on the evidence of responsible
witnesses, is essential to a fair determination of the issue in litigation. The constitution says that a party accused has a
right to meet the witnesses face to face.
To dispense with these witnesses, and to
permit their testimony to be given by those
who claim to have heard such witnesses
speak, would be to evade this important
sanction, and to put a party on trial on evidence whose falsity lie would be precluded
from either detecting or punishing. 1
Wharton's Evidence 3172.
The evidence here offered was mere hearsay, and we do not think it comes under
any of the exceptions to the Hearsay Rules.
Therefore, it was inadmissible.
The second assignment relates to the admission of the records of former convictions of crimes. The admission of the evidence was objected to, and we think the
objection was well taken, and should have
been sustained.
We agree with the learned con nsel for
the defendant that the character of the defendant as a witness, was not in question
when the records were admitted, and that
they were, therefore, offered prematurely.
This error was not obliterated by the subsequent evidence on behalf of the defendant. The doctrine in Roth's Estate, 150
Pa. 261, is applicable in this case.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment
is reversed, and a new trial awarded.
SZITH, J.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
Thei'e are two assignments of error in
this case. The first relates to the admission of evidence to prove a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made
by Anderson, a witness, who testified to an
alibi. The second, to the admission of
the records of former con victions of crimes.
The first assignment must be sustained.
Anderson, who testified to an alibi, was
asked, on cross-examination, if he had not
told Loomis that the defendant was at the
place of the murder within a half hour of
its commission. He said he had no recollection of having done so, and did not
think he had. On rebuttal the Commonwealth was allowed to ask Martin whether
Loomis had made the statement. Thedefendant objected, and we think his objection should have been sustained. Martin
testified only as to what Loomis had said,
and not as to what Anderson had said.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The convictions of Cornman for assault,
burglary, and voluntary manslaughter
were offered in evidence before he had become a witness. They must have been
offered, therefore, to show that his charac-ter was bad, with a view to lessening the
improbability or increasing the probability, of his having committed the offence
for which lie was undergoing trial. For
such a purpose, evidence of convictions is
inadmissible. The jury have no right to
consider the previous bad acts of the accused, as indications of his guilt of the act
for which he is before them arraigned.
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334, and authority cited in note 1. "This
exclusion," the learned author says, "is
founded partly on the identity of their
legal rights and interests, and partly on
the principles of public policy which lie
at the basis of civil society. For it is
essential to the happiness of social life that
the confidence subsisting between husCOMMONWEALTH vs. TRIMBLE.
band and wife should be sacredly protected and cherished in its most unlimited
Evidence-Competency of wife to testify
extent; and to break down or impair the
against husband-Prosecution of husgreat principles which protect the sanctity
band for offence prior to marriageof that relation would be to destroy the
Wife not competent-Judgment affirmbest solace of human existence." And it
ed.
makes no difference at what time the reSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
lation of husband and wife commenced.
Thus it was held in Pedley v. Wellesley,
Trimble was indicted for procuring an
3 Car. and P. 559, that where the defendabortion on the person of Ada Jenkins,
whom he has since married. The Com- ant married one of the plaintiff's witnesses after she was actually summoned
monwealth offers Mrs. Trimble to prove
to testify, that she was incompetent to
the criminal act.
give in evidence. In that case it was inHEDGES and FLEITz for the Commonsisted that a party to a suit could not, by
wealth.
his adversary's witness, deprive
marrying
the
Wife is competent to testify against
husband, "for bodily injury or violence at- him of the benefit of the evidence of such
tempted, done, or threatened," by the huswitness, and more particularly where the
band. Act of 1887, Sect. 2, P. & L. col.
action had been commenced and the party
of
4832. Act of 1887 is simply declaratory
common law. 2 Taylor on Evidence, par. actually subpoenaed before the marriage
took place. (To support this theory, the
1371 ; People v. Quanstrons, 93 Mich. 255;
Basset v. U. S., 137 U. S. 505. Procuring
case of an underwriter was cited in which
or attempting to procure an abortion is a
it was held that a party to a suit cannot,
felony. Act of March 30, 1860, P. L. 382,
by any act of his, deprive his adversary of
of
act
an
sect. 87. Abortion involves
the testimony of his witness, whether the
personal violence. Commonwealth v. Reid,
8 Phila. 396; State v. Dyer, 59 Me. 303;
act be laudable or otherwise. The court
Commonwealth v. Paynter, 8 Phila 609.
held that the case of an underwriter was
been
has
abortion
an
A wife on whom
not analogous with the case of a married
against
witness
rocured is a competent
woman; she not being allowed to testify
er husband. Navano v. State, 24 Tex.
378; State v. Dyer, supra.
to transactions occurring before marriage,
Fox and CHAPMAN for the defendant.
and that the case forms an exception to
Cited Commonwealth v. Paynter, 8
the general rule that neither a witness
Phila. 609; Commonwealth v. "Ried, 8
nor a party can, by his own act, deprive the
Phila. 385.
other party of the testimony of a witness).
OPINION OF THE COURT.
But to this general rule of exclusion, howFrom the record of the case we learn:
ever, there were some notable exceptions
First, that the proceeding was instituted
in which a husband or wife may testify
against John Trimble for the procuring of
against each other, "partly from
an abortion upon the person of Ada Jen- directly
the necessity of the case, partly for the
kins. Second, that the defendant and
protection of the wife in her life and
Ada Jenkins were intermarried before the
liberty, and partly for the sake of public
trial. Third, that the matters to which
In Com. v. Reid, 18 Phila. 385,
justice."
Mrs. Trimble (formerly Ada Jenkins) was
(decided before the passage of the act of
called to testify transpired before said
1887), Paxson, J., summarizes the cases in
marriage.
which a husband or wife may testify diAt common law, neither the husband
rectly against each other in these words:
nor the wife was admissible as a witness,
"Fourth, A husband or wife may testify
in a case, civil or criminal, in which the
directly against each other in cases of persec.
Ev.
other was a party. One Green.
The learned court below has well decided that Martin's testimony as to Loomis'
declarations out of court, could not be
employed as a means of contradicting the
witness, Anderson.
Judgment affirmed.
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sonal injuries to either committed by the
other; and also, as to facts which are in
their nature secret, and affecting the person." In the above case, Reid, the defendant, was jointly indicted with one
Paynter, for procuring and attempting to
procure by the use of certain instruments
and drugs upon the body of one Anne
McKeon, then pregnant and quick with
child, a miscarriage. One day before the
trial Paynter married Anne McKeon, the
most important witness for the Commonwealth, and without whose testimony the
charge could not have been supported.
Paynter moved for a separate trial which
was granted. When Mrs. Paynter was
called to the stand, the prisoner objected
on the ground that she was the wife of
his co-defendant. The court held that she
was a competent witness in this collateral
proceeding although it tended to criminate
her husband, but further said, "nothing
that was said by her and no judgment of
the court based upon her evidence could
ever he received against him upon the
trial of the indictment charging him with
the same offense."
The common law principles which
govern the evidence of husband and wife,
have, we believe, been incorporated in our
act of 1887, which has, in reference to the
case at bar, changed the law very little
from what it formerly was. The act sets
out that the husband or wife is a competent witness, "in any criminal proceeding
against either for bodily injury, or violence
attempted, done, or threatened, upon the
other. In Pennsylvania, the exceptions
embrace assault and battery. Commonwealth v. Reid, 18 Phila. 385; procuring
an abortion by means of an instrument or
drugs, without the consent of the patient,
Commonwealth v. Reid, supra ; and conspiracy between the husband and another
to cause the wife, though sane in fact, to
be adjudged insane. Com. v. Spink, 27
W. N. C.37. In the casesjust cited, however, the acts complained of were perpetrated by the husband against the wife
during coverture.
It has been urged that this was a
criminal injury to the wife and, therefore,
came within the exception contained in
the act of 1887. We agree with the learned
counsel for the Commonwealth, if the
abortion was committed upon the person
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of the wife, Mrs. Trimble, but it was not.
Ada Jenkins was the victim. The contention, we believe, ignores the limitation
of the exception itself. By the force of
the statute, the wife is only admitted to
testify concerning injuries to herself as a
wife, not to a woman who was not at the
time of the injury the wife of the defendant. If it be conceded that the acts constituting abortion were acts of personal
violence, they were not at the time directed
against Mrs. Trimble, the wife, but against
Ada Jenkins. In other words, she was
not the wife of Trimble, the defendant, at
the time the abortion was practiced. She
was his wife, however, at the time she
was placed upon the stand, and the act
excludes the wife from testifying against.
her husband except as to acts of personal
violence against her, as a wife.
In People v. Curiale, 70 Pacific Reporter
468, it was held that violence before marriage is not within the exception, providing that "except * * in cases of criminal
violence upon one by the other, neither husband or wife isa competent witness against
the other in a criminal action." In that
case the defendant was indicted for statutory rape. In State v. Frey, 76 Minnesota
527, it was held upon indictment for rape
by the husband upon the wife, prior to
marriage, and when she was under the age
of fourteen years, (the age of consent), that
she was incompetent to testify. In the
opinion the court said "the statute deals
with the parties in the marriage relation,
and not as to acts committed before the
marriage." In Texas the statute is similar
to ours and the exception is, "except in a
criminal prosecution for an offense comnitted by one against the other." It was
held that the wife under the above statute
could not be permitted to testify to an abortion produced by the husband upon her,
prior to her marriage. Miller v. State, 37
Texas Cr. R. 576. In People v. Shoonmaker, 117 Michigan 191, the defendant
was prosecuted for rape committed on his
wife before marriage and while she was
under the age of consent. The court held
that the evidence of the wife was incompetent and reversed the case. And the
rule here stated, is in accord with common
law. In 1 Hale P. C., itisstated that upon
an indictment for taking away and forcibly
marrying a woman, the woman so married,
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may be sworn against her husband, if the
force were continuing upon her till the
marriage, for the reason that, though a
marriage defacto, yet if it were effected by
a continued act of force, it was not a marriage de jure, unless ratified by a subsequent free co-habitation or consent. The
cases of Lady Fulwood, Cro. Car. 482 and
of Brown, 1 Vent., are referred to as authority. However, the author says: "but most
of the judges were of the opinion that, had
she lived with him any considerable time,
and consented to the ma-riage, by a free
co-habitation, she would not have been admitted as a witness against her husband."

In the case at bar, if Ada Jenkins had
never freely consented to the marriage
and co-habitation with the defendant,
John Trimble, the question would be different.
Following the rule as stated in the above
cases, we are, therefore, of the opinion that
the marriage rendered Mrs. Trimble an incompetent witness against her husband
and that her evidence is inadmissible.
WILLIS, J.
OPINION OP THE SUPREME COURT.

Judgment affirmed.
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